Overview
How might we design authentication chains so people can trust and act on AI output?
When this pattern fits
- Essential for enterprise AI agents, federated identity systems, and cross-organization automation where legible identity trails are required for audits, incident response, and precise revocation.
When to skip or lighten it
- Single-user local apps with no delegation.
- Consumer features where OAuth detail would confuse more than help (show a simplified receipt instead).
- Fully offline agents with no external identity providers.
States
State model coming soon
Key UX elements
Key UX elements coming soon
Anti-patterns to avoid
Agent actions that appear as the human with no delegation marker.
Broken chain displays that hide intermediate services.
Re-using user tokens for agents without a distinct client identity.
No revoke path for a link in the chain.
How products use it
| Product | Implementation |
|---|---|
| OAuth apps | Delegated access with app name and scoped tokens. |
| Okta | Session and impersonation trails for admins. |
| Google Workspace | Audit logs for apps acting on user behalf. |
| AWS IAM | Role assumption chains in CloudTrail. |
Implementation
Copy this prompt to generate a production-ready implementation in Cursor, Claude Code, Lovable, or any AI coding agent.
Generate a production-ready implementation of the "Authentication Chains" AI interface design pattern.
Pattern Definition:Frequently asked questions
What is an authentication chain in agent UX?
It is the visible sequence of identities behind an action—user → agent → connector → target API—so “on whose behalf” is never ambiguous.
What should users see?
A short receipt: “Agent X used your Google Drive access to edit Doc Y.” Link to full chain for admins.
How does this relate to agent identity?
Agent identity names the actor. Authentication chains show the credentials and delegations that actor used.
Why do chains matter for compliance?
Regulators and security teams need to prove authorization paths. Opaque “the AI did it” is not enough.